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Abstract
Counterfeit apps impersonate existing popular apps in at-
tempts to misguide users to install them for various reasons
such as collecting personal information, spreading malware,
or simply to increase their advertisement revenue. Many
counterfeits can be identified once installed, however even a
tech-savvy user may struggle to detect them before installa-
tion as app icons and descriptions can be quite similar to the
original app. To this end, this paper proposes to use neural
embeddings generated by state-of-the-art convolutional neu-
ral networks (CNNs) to measure the similarity between im-
ages. Our results show that for the problem of counterfeit de-
tection a novel approach of using style embeddings given by
the Gram matrix of CNN filter responses outperforms base-
line methods such as content embeddings and SIFT features.
We show that further performance increases can be achieved
by combining style embeddings with content embeddings.
We present an analysis of approximately 1.2 million apps
from Google Play Store and identify a set of potential coun-
terfeits for top-1,000 apps. Under a conservative assumption,
we were able to find 139 apps that contain malware in a set
of 6,880 apps that showed high visual similarity to one of
the top-1,000 apps in Google Play Store.
1. Introduction
Availability of third party apps is one of the major reasons
behind the wide adoption of smartphones. The two most
popular app markets, Google Play Store and Apple App
Store, hosted approximately 3.5 million and 2.1 million apps
at the first quarter of 2018 [1, 2] and these numbers are likely
to grow further as they have been in last few years. Handling
such large numbers of apps is challenging for app market
operators since there is always a trade-off between how
much scrutiny is put into checking apps and encouraging
developers by providing fast time-to-market. As a result,
problematic apps of various kinds have made into the apps
markets including malware, before they have been taken
down after receiving user complaints [3, 4].
One category of problematic apps making into app mar-
kets is counterfeits (i.e. apps that attempt to impersonate
popular apps). The overarching goals behind app imperson-
ation can be broadly categorised into two. First, the develop-
ers of counterfeits are trying to attract app installations and
increase their advertisement revenue. This is exacerbated by
the fact that some popular apps are not available in some
countries and users who search the names of those popular
apps can become easy targets of impersonations. Second is
to use counterfeits as a means of spreading malware. For in-
stance, in November 2017 a fake version of the popular mes-
senger app WhatsApp [5] was able to get into Google Play
Store and was downloaded over 1 million times before it was
taken down. Similar instances were reported in the past for
popular apps such as Netflix, IFTTT, and Angry Birds [6–8].
More recently, counterfeits have been used to secretly mine
crypto currencies in smartphones [9]. In Figure 1 we show
an example counterfeit named Temple Piggy1 which shows
a high visual similarity to the popular arcade game Temple
Run.2
a) Original (Temple Run) b) Counterfeit (Temple Piggy)
Figure 1: An example counterfeit app for the popular arcade
game Temple Run
In this paper, we propose a neural embedding-based im-
age retrieval framework that allows to identify visually sim-
ilar apps to a given app icon from a large corpus of icons.
Indeed, recent advances in Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) allow to generate feature embeddings to a given im-
age that are related to the content of the image using pre-
trained models such as AlexNet [10], VGGNet [11], and
ResNet [12]. In particular, we demonstrate that content em-
beddings are moderately suitable for the task of visually sim-
ilar app icon detection as many fake apps tend to have a sim-
1 Temple Piggy is currently not available in Google Play Store.
2 Temple Run - https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.imangi.templerun.
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ilarity in the image style in terms of colour and texture than
the actual content. In addition, we show that style embed-
dings generated from the Gram matrix of convolutional layer
filter responses of the same pre-trained models achieve better
results compared to baseline methods such as Scale Invariant
Feature Transforms (SIFT) [13] and combining content and
style embeddings further increases the detection rates. More
specifically, we make the following contributions:
• We propose to use style embeddings to detect visually
similar mobile apps icons and introduce a novel image
embedding that combines both content and style repre-
sentations of an image that allows higher retrieval rates
compared to baseline methods such as SIFT.
• Using a large dataset of over 1.2 million app icons, we
show that style embeddings achieve 9%-14% higher re-
trieval rates in comparison to content embeddings and
SIFT-based methods.
• We identify a set of 6,880 highly visually similar app
icons to the top-1,000 apps in Google Play and show that
under a conservative assumption, 139 of them contain
malware. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
large-scale study that investigates the depth of app coun-
terfeit problem in app stores.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In
Section 2, we present the related work. In Section 3, we
present our dataset followed by the methodology in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 presents our results. We discuss limitations
and possible future improvements in Section 6 and Section 7
concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
2.1 Mobile Malware & Greyware
While there is a plethora of work on detecting mobile mal-
ware [14–18] and various fraudulent activities in app mar-
kets [19–22], only a limited amount of work focused on the
similarity of mobile apps. One line of such work focused on
detecting clones and rebranding. Viennot et al. [23] used
the Jaccard similairty of app resources in the likes of im-
ages and layout XMLs to identify clusters of similar apps
and then used the developer name and certificate information
to differentiate clones from rebranding. Crussell et al. [24]
proposed to use features generated from the source codes
to identify similar apps and then used the developer infor-
mation to isolate true clones. In contrast to above work, our
work focuses on identifying visually similar apps rather than
the exact similarity (i.e. clones), which is a more challenging
problem.
Limited amount of work focused on identifying visually
similar mobile apps [25–28]. For example, Sun et al. [25]
proposed DroidEagle that identifies the visually similar apps
based on the LayoutTree of XML layouts of Android apps.
While the results are interesting this method has several lim-
itations. First, all visually similar apps may not be necessar-
ily similar in XML layouts and it is necessary to consider
the similarities in images. Second, app developers are start-
ing to use code encryption methods, thus accessing codes
and layout files may not always possible. Third, dependency
of specific aspects related to one operating system will not
allow to make comparisons between heterogeneous app mar-
kets and in such situations only metadata and image similar-
ity are meaningful. Recently, Malisa et al. [28] studied how
likely would users detect spoofing application using a com-
plete rendering of the application itself. To do so, authors
introduced a new metric representing the distance between
the original app screenshot and the spoofing app. In contrast
to above work, the proposed work intends to use different
neural embeddings derived from app icons that will better
capture visual similarities.
2.2 Visual similarity & style search
Number of work looked into the possibility of transferring
style of an image to another using neural networks. For ex-
ample, Gatys et al. [29, 30] proposed a neural style transfer
algorithm that is able to transfer the stylistic features of well-
known artworks to target images using feature representa-
tions learned by Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs).
Several other methods proposed to achieve the same objec-
tive either by updating pixels in the image iteratively or by
optimising a generative model iteratively and producing the
styled image through a single forward pass. A summary of
the available style transfer algorithms can be found in the
survey by Jing et al. [31].
Johnson et al. [32] have proposed a feed-forward network
architecture capable of real-time style transfer by solving
the optimisation problem formulated by Gatys et al. [30].
Similarly, to style transfer, convolutional neural networks
have been successfully used for image searching. In partic-
ular, Bell & Bala [33] proposed a Siamese CNN to learn a
high-quality embedding that represent visual similarity and
demonstrated the utility of these embeddings on several vi-
sual search tasks such as searching products across or within
categories. Tan et al. [34] and Matsuo & Yanai [35] used
embeddings created from CNNs to classify artistic styles. In
contrast to these work, our work focuses on retrieving visu-
ally similar Android apps and we highlight the importance
of style embeddings in this particular problem.
3. Dataset
We collected our dataset by crawling Google Play Store
using a Python crawler between January and March, 2018.
The crawler was initially seeded with the web pages of the
top free and paid apps as of January, 2018 and it recursively
discovered apps by following the links in the seeded pages
and the pages of subsequently discovered apps. Such links
include apps by the same developer and similar apps as
recommended by Google. For each app, we downloaded the
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metadata such as app name, app category, developer name,
and number of downloads as well as the app icon in .jpg or
.png format (of size 300 x 300 x 3 - height, width, and three
layers for RGB colour channels). The app icon is the same
icon visible in the smartphone once the app is installed and
also what users see when browsing Google Play Store.
We discovered and collected information from 1,250,808
apps during this process. For each app, we also downloaded
the app executable in APK format using Google Play Down-
loader via Command line3 tool by simulating a Google
Pixel virtual device. We were able to download APKs for
1,024,511 apps out of the total 1,250,808 apps apps we dis-
covered. The main reason behind this difference is the paid
apps for which the APK can’t be downloaded without pay-
ing. Also, there were some apps that did not support the
virtual device we used. Finally, the APK crawler was op-
erating in a different thread than the main crawler as the
APKs download is slower due to their large sizes. As a re-
sult, there were some apps that were discovered, yet by the
time APK crawler reaches them they were no longer avail-
able in Google Play Store.
Labelled set: To evaluate the performance of various image
similarity metrics we require a ground truth dataset that con-
tains similar images to a given image. We used a heuristic ap-
proach to shortlist a possible set of visually similar apps and
then refined it by manual checking. Our heuristic is based on
the fact that there are apps in the app market that have multi-
ple legitimate versions. For example, popular game app An-
gry Birds has multiple versions such as Angry Birds Rio, An-
gry Birds Seasons, and Angry Birds Go. However, all these
apps are using the same characters and as such icons are sim-
ilar from both content (i.e. birds) and stylistic point of view
(i.e. colour and texture).
Thus, we first identified the set of developers who has
published more than two apps in app store and one app has
at least 500,000 downloads. In a set of apps from the same
developer, the app with the highest number of downloads
was selected as the base app. For each other app in the set,
we then calculated the character level cosine similarity of
their app name to the base app name and selected only the
apps that had over 0.8 similarity and in the same Google
Play Store app category as the base app. Through this pro-
cess we identified 2,689 groups of apps. Finally, we manu-
ally inspected each of these groups and checked whether the
group consists of actual visually similar apps. In some oc-
casions we found that some groups contained apps that are
not visually similar and we discarded those groups. Also,
we found that in some groups there were apps that were not
visually similar to the others of the group and we removed
those apps from the group. At the end of this process we had
806 app groups having a total of 3,910 apps as our labelled
3 https://github.com/matlink/gplaycli
Figure 2: Example similar app groups from the labelled set
set. We show some example app groups from our labelled
set in Figure 2.
Top-1,000 apps: To establish a set of potential counterfeits
and to investigate the depth of app counterfeit problem in
Google Play Store, we used top-1,000 apps since counter-
feits majorly target popular apps. We selected top-1,000 apps
by sorting the apps by the number of downloads, number of
reviews, and average rating similar to what was done in our
previous work [4]. As we describe later in Section 5, for each
app in top-1,000 we queried the top − 10 similar apps by
icon similarity in the set of all 1.2 million apps and checked
whether the retrieved apps contain malware using the online
malware check tool VirusTotal.4
4. Methodology
As mentioned before, the main problem we are trying ad-
dress is that “given an app icon how can we find visually
similar icons from a large icon corpus?”. To solve this prob-
lem, our methodology involves two main phases; icon en-
coding and icon retrieval as discussed below.
4.1 App Icon Encoding
We encode the original app icon image of size 300× 300×
3 to a lower dimension for efficient search as well as to
avoid false positives happening due to Euclidean distance
(L2 distance) at large dimensions [36]. We create three types
of low dimensional representations of the images.
i) SIFT features: As a baseline method, we use the Scale-
Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) [13] that extracts fea-
tures from an image which are invariant to scale and rota-
tion. SIFT features are commonly used in object detection,
face recognition, and image stitching. We generated lower
dimensional SIFT representations for all 1.2 million apps.
These representations are of dimension ti × 128, where ti is
the number of key-points detected by SIFT detector for icon
i.
ii) Content embeddings: To extract the content represen-
tation of an icon we used the pre-trained VGGNet [11]; a
4 https://www.virustotal.com
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state-of-the-art convolutional neural network that is trained
on ImageNet [37]. The fully connected layers of VGGNet
constitutes a potential good representation of the content
features of the app icon. We fed all 1.2M app icons to the
VGGNet, and use the content embeddings, C ∈ R4096 gen-
erated at the last fully connected layer of VGGNet (usually
called as the fc_7 layer) that have shown good results in the
past [38, 39].
iii) Style embeddings: As mentioned in Section 1, content
similarity itself is not sufficient for counterfeit detection as
sometimes developers keep the visual similarity and change
the content. For example, if a developer is trying to create
a fake app for a popular game that has birds as characters,
they can create a game that has the same visual “look and
feel” and replace birds with cats. Therefore, we require an
embedding that represent the style of an image.
Several work demonstrated that the filter responses of
convolutional neural networks can be used to represent the
style of an image [30, 40]. For example, Gayts et al. [30]
used pre-trained convolutional neural networks to transfer
the style characteristics of an arbitrary source image to an ar-
bitrary target image. This was done by defining an objective
function which captures the content loss and the style loss.
To represent the style of an image, authors used the Gram
matrix of the filter responses of the convolution layers. We
followed a similar approach and used the fifth convolution
layer (specifically conv5_1) of the VGGNet to obtain the
style representation of the image, as previous comparable
work indicated that conv5_1 provides better performance in
classifying artistic styles [35]. In the process of getting the
embeddings for icons, each icon is passed through the VG-
GNet, and at conv5_1 the icon is convolved with pre-trained
filters and activated through relu (Rectified Linear Unit) ac-
tivation function.
More specifically, for an image I , let F l ∈ RNl×Ml be
the filter response of layer l, where Nl denotes the number
of filters in layer l and Ml is the height times width of the
feature map. F lij is the activation of i
th filter at position j in
the layer l.
Similar to Gayts et al. [30], to capture style information
we use the correlations of the activations calculated by the
dot product. That is, for a given image I , let Gl ∈ RNl×Nl
be the dot product Gram matrix at layer l, i.e.
Glij =
Ml∑
k=1
F likF
l
jk, (1)
where F l ∈ RNl×Ml is the activations of I . Then,Gl is used
as the style representation of an image to retrieve similar
images. The conv5_1 − layer of the VGGNet we use has
512 filters and thus the resulting Gram matrix is of size
G5 ∈ R512×512.
Gram matrix is symmetric as it represents the correlations
between the filter outputs. Therefore, we only consider the
upper triangular portion and the diagonal of the Gram matrix
as our style representation vector, S ∈ R131,328. Though this
reduces the dimension of the style vector by about half, the
style embedding dimension is much larger compared to the
content embeddings,C ∈ R4,096. Thus, to further reduce the
dimension of style embeddings we used very sparse random
projection [41]. We selected sparse random projection over
other dimensionality reduction methods such as PCA and t-
SNE due to its computational efficiency.
More specifically, let A ∈ Rn×D be our style matrix
that contains the style embeddings of a mini batch of n (in
the experiments we used n=20,000) icons stacked vertically,
and D is the dimension of the style vector, which in this
case is 131, 328. Then, we create a sparse random matrix
R ∈ RD×k and multiply it with A. The elements rij of R
are drawn according to the below distribution,
rij =
4
√
D

1, with prob. 1
2
√
D
0, with prob. 1− 1√
D
−1, with prob. 1
2
√
D
(2)
At large dimensionsR, becomes sparse as the probability
of getting a zero is increasing with D. Since sparse matri-
ces are almost orthogonal [42] [43], multiplication with R,
projectsA in another orthogonal dimension.
B =
1√
k
AR ∈ Rn×k (3)
Each row of B gives a dimensionality reduced vector
S′ ∈ Rk and in our case we used k = 4, 096 to ensure
the size of style embeddings matches the size of the content
embeddings. In Figure 3, we show a summary of our icon
encoding process.
4.2 Similar App Icon Retrieval
During the icon retrieval process we take an app icon, cal-
culate the required embeddings and search in the encoded
space for top− k nearest neighbours using either the cosine
distance or L2 norm as the distance metric.
Let Ctarget, S′target be respectively the content and style
embedding for the icon of the target app (i.e. the original
app), for each image i in the icon corpus, we calculate differ-
ent distance metrics as shown in Table 1. When we combine
content and style embeddings, we used an empirically de-
cided coefficient α that defines the relative weight between
the style and content embeddings.
For the SIFT baseline, we only used the L2 distance
between the SIFT vectors as defined by the original SIFT
paper [13]. That is, assume at the retrieval stage, for the
query image i we have ti descriptors and for each image
j in the dataset we have tj descriptors. Then, for each image
j in the dataset, we find the closest pairs for all ti descriptors
among tj descriptors. We define the total distance as the sum
of the distances between all ti descriptors and its closest
pairs.
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Figure 3: Summary of the icon encoding process
Table 1: Distance metrics
Distance metric Definition
L2 norm based
ContentL2 ||Ctarget − Ci||2
StyleL2 ||S′target − S′i||2
(Content+ Style)L2 ContentL2+αStyleL2
Cosine distance based
Contentcos 1− CtargetCi||Ctarget||2||Ci||2
Stylecos 1− StargetSi||Starget||2||Si||2
(Content+ Style)cos Contentcos+αStylecos
5. Results
5.1 Evaluation of Embeddings
To quantify the performance of the different embeddings we
first encoded all 1.2 million app icons to the three lower
dimensional embeddings we test; SIFT, content, and style.
Then for each app in the labelled set, we retrieved the top−5,
top−10, top−15, and top−20 nearest neighbours from the
encoded space for each embedding type usingL2 and cosine
distances. When we measure the distance using combined
content and style embeddings, we have a hyper-parameter
α that defines the contribution of style and the content em-
beddings. In cosine distance measure all the distances are
between 0 and 1. However in L2 distance is not bounded. As
such, the range of α differs for cosine and L2 distances.
The idea behind this process is that if a given embedding
is a good metric for image similarity, for a given image it
must be able to retrieve all similar images in the labelled set
in the nearest neighbour search. The order of the retrieval
is not important as we do not know whether there are more
similar images in the unlabelled corpus of app icons (e.g.
the developer has multiple identities) and as we also did not
rank the apps inside groups in the labelled set. We define
retrieval rate as the percentage of labelled images we were
able to retrieve out of 3,910 labelled images. One limitation
Table 2: Retrieval rates for the labelled dataset
Embedding top-5 top-10 top-15 top-20
SIFT 42.89% 46.37% 48.51% 49.45%
Cosine distance based
Contentcos 44.06% 47.50% 50.51% 52.40%
Stylecos 53.24% 57.61% 61.22% 63.03%
Contentcos + αStylecos
α = 100 53.46% 57.69% 61.36% 63.13%
α = 10 53.70% 57.86% 61.71% 63.75%
α = 6 53.73% 58.11% 61.86% 63.80%
α = 2 53.15% 57.36% 61.14% 63.25%
α = 1 51.32% 55.64% 59.33% 61.46%
α = 0.5 49.90% 53.78% 57.11% 59.10%
α = 0.1 45.83% 49.67% 52.71% 54.48%
L2 norm based
ContentL2 41.32% 44.59% 47.36% 49.08%
StyleL2 47.76% 51.39% 54.46% 56.24%
ContentL2 + αStyleL2
α = 1e6 43.83% 47.07% 49.95% 51.57%
α = 1e7 47.72% 51.57% 54.87% 56.74%
α = 1e8 48.66% 52.09% 55.40% 56.93%
α = 1e9 47.75% 51.48% 54.57% 56.28%
of this method is that there can be scenarios where the corpus
contains much better legitimate similar images than the la-
belled images and the number of such images is higher than
the k value we select. In such cases while the embeddings
retrieve relevant images, those do not count towards the re-
trieval rate. Thus, the results of this analysis only present
the relative performance of the embeddings and a 100% re-
trieval rate is not expected. We summerise our results in Ta-
ble 2.
According to the results in Table 2, neural embeddings
perform better than the SIFT features. Also, it is noticeable
that style embeddings outperforms content embeddings. For
example, for four top-k scenarios we consider the style em-
beddings have approximately 8% – 9% higher retrieval rates
than the content embeddings for cosine similarity and an
approximately 6% higher retrieval rate for L2 distance. Re-
sults also show that cosine distance produces better results in
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Figure 4: Top-10 visually similar apps for the 10 top ranked apps
majority of the scenarios. Combining stye embeddings with
content embeddings increases the performance slightly. For
example, at best case (α = 6; i.e. style embeddings carry
six times weight compared to content embeddings) combin-
ing embeddings increase the retrieval rate by approximately
0.5%–0.6%.
To elaborate further on the performance of the embed-
dings qualitatively, In Figure 4 we show the top-10 visu-
ally similar apps we retrieved under different embeddings
for some well-known apps. Figure 4-(a) shows that apart
from identifying 1-2 similar apps (E.g. row 1 - Google Play
Services, row 2 - Facebook, and row 7 - Skype), SIFT does
not identify visually similar apps. Results of content em-
beddings shown in Figure 4-(b) indicate that they perform
better and has identified good fits in several cases (E.g. row
1 - Google Play Services and E.g. row 9 - Google Maps).
The improvement provided by style embeddings is visible in
some of the cases in Figure 4-(c). For instance, style embed-
dings has retrieved app icons that have the same “look and
feel” in terms of colour for Facebook Messenger (row 5) and
Skype (row 7). Finally, the combined embeddings haven’t
perform significantly different from style embeddings alone
as can be seen in Figure 4-(d). This can be expected as there
was only approximately 1% improvement in combined em-
beddings in the labelled set.
5.2 Retrieving Potential Counterfeits
We next use the embeddings that performed best (Contentcos
+ αStylecos where α = 6) to retrieve visually similar apps
for top-1,000 apps and check the availability of malware,
as spreading malware is one of the main objectives behind
publishing counterfeit apps. In this analysis, we focus only
on the top apps since they usually are the main targets of
counterfeits. For each app in top-1,000 we retrieved top−10
visually similar apps from the corpus of 1.2 million apps
that are not from the same developer and with the same
category as the top app. However, the top − 10 neighbour
search is forced to return 10 closest app icons irrespective
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Figure 5: Graph based visualisation of top-100 apps and
visually similar app icons (Small clusters in this figure do
not contain apps from the same developer)
of the distance distribution and as a result there can be
cases where the search returns 10 results, nonetheless they
are a large distant apart from the original app. Thus, we
applied a distance threshold to further narrow down the
retrieved results. We varied the distance threshold from 0
to 1 at 0.01 intervals and calculated the retrieval rate in
the labelled set for each threshold value (i.e. percentage of
retrieved apps within the radius of the threshold). Then we
calculated the knee-point [44] of the retrieval rate against the
threshold graph, after which the improvement of retrieval
rate is not significant. The threshold value we calculated
was 0.27 (note that is the normalised distance as for the
embedding considered here, the closet possible distance is
zero while the maximum possible distance apart is 7).
This process resulted 6,880 unique apps that are poten-
tially counterfeits of one or more apps with in top-1,000.
Out of this 6,880 we had APK files for 6,286 apps. In Fig-
ure 5, we show a graph-based visualisation of the app icons
of potential counterfeits we identified for top-100 apps. The
centre node of each small cluster represent an app in top-100
and the connected apps to that are the visually similar apps
we identified for that particular app.
5.3 Malware analysis
We then checked each of the 6,286 potential counterfeits us-
ing the private API of the online malware analysis tool Virus-
Total. VirusTotal scans the APKs with over 60 commercial
anti-virus tools (AV-tools) in the likes of AVG, Avast, Mi-
crosoft, BitDefender, Kaspersky, and McAfee and provides
a report on how many of the tools identified whether the sub-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No. of reporting AV-tools
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Figure 6: Number of apps against the number of reporting
AV-tools in VirusTotal
mitted APKs contain malware. In Figure 6 we show a sum-
marised view of the number of apps that were tagged for
possible inclusion of malware by one or more AV-tools in
VirusTotal and their availability in Google Play Store as of
19-04-2018. As the figure shows there are 853 APKs that are
tagged by at least one of the AV-tools for possible inclusion
of malware.
However, there can be false positives and as such a single
AV-tools tagging an APK as malware in VirusTotal may
not necessarily mean that the APK contains malware. As
a result, previous work used different thresholds for the
number of AV-tools that must report to consider an APK
as malware. Ikram et al. [45] used a conservative threshold
of 5 and Arp et al. [46] used a more relaxed threshold of
2. Figure 6 shows that we have 340 apps if the AV-tool
threshold is 2 and 139 apps if the threshold is 5, out of which
305 and 122 apps respectively, are still there in Google Play
Store.
In Table 3, we show some example apps that were tagged
as containing malware and their original app. We also show
the number of downloads, number of requested permissions,
and the number embedded advertisement libraries obtained
by decompiling the app and using a previously published
list of advertisement libraries [47] for both the original app
and the potential counterfeit. The table shows that while the
counterfeit does not attract as large numbers of downloads
as the original app in some occasions they have been down-
loaded significant number of times (e.g. Temple Theft Run).
In an extreme case, a potential counterfeit for DU Battery
Save asks approximately 9 times more permissions than the
original app.
6. Discussion
Using a large dataset of over 1.2 million app icons and over 1
million app executables, in this paper we presented insights
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Table 3: Example visually similar apps that contain malware
App icon AV Tools Downloads Permissions Ad. librariesOriginal Similar Original Similar Original Similar Original Similar
Temple Run 2 Temple Theft Run*
6 500M+ 500k+ 8 4 6 10
Minecraft†
Survival Blocks
5 10M+ 10k+ - 5 - 6
Parallel Space
Double Account
15 50M+ 100k+ 130 145 3 2
Sniper 3D
Elite Sniper Killer*
6 100M+ 500+ 11 7 11 6
Clean Master
RAM Booster*
5 50M+ 500+ 34 22 4 1
DU Battery Save
Battery Saver
6 100M+ 1k+ 24 213 3 2
* App is currently not available in Google Play Store
† APK is not available as the app is a paid app
to the app counterfeit problem in mobile app markets. The
objective of the proposed embeddings-based method is to
quickly and automatically assess a new submission and de-
cide whether it resembles an existing app. If the new app is
visually similar to an existing app, the app market operator
can decide to do further security checks that can potentially
include dynamic analysis as well as manual checks. We next
discuss the limitations of our work and possible future ex-
tensions.
6.1 Limitations
Establishing a ground truth dataset for this type of problem is
challenging due to several reasons. In this work, to build the
ground truth dataset we used a heuristic approach to shortlist
groups of apps that can potentially show visual similarities
and then refine the dataset by manual inspection. However,
as described in Section 5, there is a possibility that the
unlabelled portion of data can still contain better similar apps
than the labelled set and such apps can be returned during the
nearest neighbour search instead of the target apps. This will
result in a lower performance in terms of retrieval rate; yet
in reality received images also show high visual similarity.
One possible solution for this is to use crowdsourcing to
directly evaluate the performance of the embeddings without
using a labelled dataset. For instance, retrieved images can
be shown to a set of reviewers together with the original
image and ask them to assign values for similarity with
the original image. Then these values can be aggregated
to come up with an overall score for the performance of
the embedding. Crowdsourcing will also alleviate any biases
introduced by individuals as visually similarity of images in
some occasions can be subjective.
6.2 VGGNet Fine-tuning
In this work we used a pre-trained VGGNet to generate
both content and style embeddings. However, the VGGNet
was trained for content identification and further fine tuning
of VGGNet could improve the style embeddings, which in
return may increase retrieval rates. For example, one such
approach may be to use a different loss function such as
perceptual loss [32] compared to the current cross entropy
loss function and fine-tune the VGGNet so that it can further
capture the similarities in styles in addition to the content.
Another possible approach is to use triplet loss to train the
network [48]. That is, at training time the network is shown
sets of three images; base image, a highly visually similar
image to the base image, and a highly dissimilar image to
the base image.
Another potential improvement is the fusion of activa-
tions of several convolutional layers. In this work we used
only the fifth convolution layer of the VGGNet to generate
the style embeddings. This can be further explored to check
whether creating embeddings from several convolution lay-
ers and combining them in some form (e.g. linear weighted
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Figure 7: Some example apps that showed high visual simi-
larity to one of the apps in top-1,000, yet did not contain any
malware
sums or deep features using autoencoders) will improve the
retrieval rates.
6.3 Identifying Counterfeits
Our evaluation of the retrieved set of highly visually similar
apps was limited to the apps that possibly contain malware.
Nonetheless, there can be counterfeits that do not contain
malware and sometimes it can be difficult to automatically
decide whether a given app is counterfeit or not. In Figure 7
we show some examples we retrieved that showed high
visually similarity to one of the apps in top-1,000 yet did
not contain malware or showed a significant difference in
permissions or ad libraries. For instance, in Figure 7-(a) we
show two visually similar apps we retrieved for the popular
game Words with Friends. While the icons are similar it is
difficult to decide whether these are true counterfeits and
as a result some other factors such as app functionality and
description need to be considered.
For such scenarios, instead of the using only the simi-
larity in app icons, the overall similarity of all the images
available in Google Play Store pertaining to the two apps
can be considered. This is because a developer can make
the icons slightly different from the original app, and yet
have the same visual “look and feel” inside the app. Also, a
number of work highlighted that apps can be clustered based
on functional similarity using text mining methods [22, 49].
Combining such methods with state-of-art techniques such
as word vectors and document vectors [50, 51] and using
them in conjunction with image similarity can further im-
prove results. Nonetheless, for some cases still a manual in-
tervention may be required. For example, in above case of
Words with Friends the similar apps are also word games
and they are likely to show high visual similarity in inter-
nal GUIs as well as textual descriptions. In such scenarios
again it might be useful to rely on crowdsourcing to obtain
an overall assessment.
7. Conclusion
Using a dataset of over 1.2 million app icons and their ex-
ecutables, we presented the problem of counterfeits in mo-
bile app markets. We proposed an icon encoding method
that allows to efficiently search potential counterfeits to a
given app, using neural embeddings generated by a state-
of-the-art convolutional neural network. More specifically
for app counterfeit detection problem, we showed that style
embeddings generated by the Gram matrix of the conv5_1
convolution layer of a pre-trained VGGNet is more suitbale
compared to commonly used content embeddings (generated
by the last fully connected layer - fc_7) and SIFT baselines.
Our results also indicated that combining content and style
embeddings can further increase the detection rates of coun-
terfeits. For the top-1,000 apps in Google Play Store, we
identified a set of 6,880 highly visually similar apps and we
found that under a highly conservative assumption, 139 of
them contain malware. To the best of our knowledge this is
the first work to do a large-scale study on the counterfeits
in mobile app markets using image similarity methods and
propose effective embeddings to automatically identify po-
tential counterfeits.
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